One can only imagine that while the Boston Red Sox were celebrating their 2013 World Series championship, there alone sitting in a dark corner office was Jack Zduriencik, astonished from what he was seeing transpire on the TV.
Because that night, Zduriencik had to witness a Red Sox team – one that finished 69-93 just a year ago – be crowned the best team in all of baseball for 2013.
And as second year Boston GM Ben Cherington conveyed to the world that he simply was “just happy to be along for the ride,” one can be sure at that very moment, Zduriencik’s blood pressure began to rise ever so slightly, realizing that, entering his sixth year as GM of the Seattle Mariners, he had yet to put together a team that has allowed him to feel – even for just a moment – “happy to be along for the ride.”
2013 was supposed to be that type of season for Zduriencik and the Mariners. No, not one that would be punctuated with a World Series Championship. But one that would see the Mariners continue to grow and reach expectations of surpassing the .500 mark and even possibly contend for a playoff spot. The type of season that would validate the prolonged rebuilding plan that Zduriencik and Howard Lincoln have vowed was the right path to winning.
But 2013 ended up being quite the opposite. And the Red Sox World Series championship season only provided further testimony that perhaps Zduriencik needs to re-evaluate the Mariners’ rebuild approach, and maybe take some notes from the Red Sox’s second year GM.
Unlike Zduriencik and the Mariners, Cherington utilizes a develop and contend at the same time approach by placing an importance upon both cultivating homegrown talent, and investing in quality free agents who can facilitate winning in the immediate and in the years to come .
Cherington’s belief, of course, should be nothing new to the Mariners. It was the same method used by former GM Pat Gillick who dipped heavily into free agency while refraining from trading away top prospects. But despite the string of 90+ win seasons and playoff appearances accomplished during the Gillick years, these days what is heard from Mariners headquarters is that developing from within, while acquiring cheap disposable stopgap free agents, is the smarter approach. The theory being that if a low cost veteran acquisition doesn’t pan out, the team can simply cut them mid-season and eat the remaining money owed without being hamstrung by multi-year contract obligations. Of course, if and when that happens, what truly has occurred is wasted valuable payroll, and a team struggling as a result of poor veteran acquisitions. And as Mariner fans can attest to the past five seasons, wasted payroll and poor veteran acquisitions has summed up the Mariners and their free agent acquisitions.
What the Mariners need to remember is that if a team goes about free agency with intelligence, the cost-benefit analysis will play to the investor’s favor despite the money spent up front.
The 2013 Boston Red Sox were a prime example of this, and one way this is revealed is via team WAR.
While Zduriencik and the Mariners were busy offering up a king’s ransom for Josh Hamilton, the Red Sox went out and focused their efforts on second-tier free agents. Among those that they signed were Shane Victorino, Jonny Gomes, Mike Napoli, and David Ross – two outfielders, a DH/1B, and a backup catcher. The foursome would fill holes in the Red Sox lineup at a cost of 34.1 million for 2013.
Now, before we go any further, there is the argument that the Mariners were unable to spend 34.1 million on free agents, which would have raised payroll upwards to 100 million. But let’s not forget that the Mariners were prepared to drop 20 million on Hamilton. Such a signing would have put payroll around 95 million assuming that a Hamilton acquisition would have eliminated the need to trade for Michael Morse. As the attempted Hamilton signing illustrates, the money is there to spend. It’s just a matter of how the Mariners choose to spend it.
After the Mariner’s all-or-nothing pursuit of Hamilton came up empty, Zduriencik – like the Red Sox – acquired two outfielders, a DH/1B, and a backup catcher to fill holes for 2013. Morse, Raul Ibanez, Kendrys Morales, and Kelly Shoppach would end up costing half as much as the Red Sox’s four acquisitions; 16.25 million for the upcoming season.
According to Baseball-Reference, Morse, Ibanez, Morales and Shoppach wound up combining for a dismal 1.8 WAR for the Mariners in 2013. Shoppach ended up being designated for assignment mid-season, and Morse lived up to his can’t-stay-healthy reputation by spending much of the time on the disabled list before being traded to the Orioles. Despite paying out less than half as much as Boston, Zduriencik spent a whopping 9 million per WAR produced from his veteran acquisitions.
Conversely, Victorino, Gomes, Napoli, and Ross would become central players for the Red Sox, combining for 12.1 WAR. Despite spending over twice as much as the Mariners, Cherington not only received better production, but ended up paying a mere 2.8 million per WAR produced.
The Mariners’ investment costs may have been considerably less, but their returns were practically non-existent. As the old saying goes, the Mariners got what they paid for.
The Mariners 2013 payroll landed somewhere in the neighborhood of 82 million and finished with a team WAR of 23.2, resulting in a 3.53 million spent per WAR produced. If, say, the Mariners had acquired Victorino, Gomes, Napoli, and Ross instead of Morse, Ibanez, Morales and Shoppach, their payroll would have been 99 million, their team WAR would have increased to 33.5, and their per WAR expenditure would have dropped to 2.96 million.
Yes, the Mariners would have needed to spend more money, but in the end, a far better return on their investment would have been achieved. And any successfully run business will place more importance on returns than on investment costs.
Now, a team WAR of 33.5 would not have been enough to expect a playoff berth. Normally playoff-caliber teams produce a team WAR of 40 or more. The average team WAR of the five American League playoff teams this year was 47.12, with Cleveland coming in at the lowest with a team WAR of 39.3.
But a team WAR or 30 or better should result in a .500 or better season. If we look at the four teams that didn’t make the American League playoffs but who finished with an above .500 record – the Rangers, Orioles, Yankees and Royals – their average team WAR was 38.65 with the Yankees coming in with the lowest team WAR of 30.3 and finishing 85-77.
Accordingly, it can be fairly surmised that if the Mariners had produced a 33.5 team WAR, they would have finished 2013 with at least 81 wins. With a solid core of returning veterans and expected growth from their blossoming group young players, the Mariners would seemingly be in good position to take the next step towards playoff contention. But instead, the Mariners went the opposite direction, and ended up distancing themselves as a playoff caliber contender.
There’s no question that the Mariners have a lot of areas that need to be fixed, heading into 2014. The Mariners currently have no manager, are riddled with holes throughout their starting lineup, rotation, and bullpen, and are being led by a GM whose future with the Mariners is, at best, questionable.
But one area that should be easily corrected entering 2014 is the methodology behind Zduriencik’s veteran acquisitions. Cheap and safe have not delivered. It’s time the Mariners take a page out of the Red Sox financial playbook, and begin making shrewd intellectual investments that will generate cost-effective results rather than acquisitions premised primarily on reduced risk, minimal contract obligations, and lowered payroll.
Mission:Mariner 