Jerry Dipoto and the Mariners made their first substantial off-season moves by picking up Seth Smith’s $7 million option, declining Chris Iannetta’s $4.25 million option, and waiving Nori Aoki, who was immediately claimed by the Houston Astros.

All three players were inconsistent in 2016, with Iannetta and Smith fading badly in the second half, and Aoki taking a full first half before delivering the type of production that was envisioned when initially signed.

Dipoto previously stated that Mike Zunino would be penciled in as the starting catcher for 2017, that he planned on retaining Smith, and that Iannetta’s option was too pricey for a backup catcher.  So none of these moves were surprising.

But did Dipoto error by keeping Smith and discarding Aoki?

Both Smith and Aoki fit the mold of Dipoto’s preferred type of offensive player: contact hitters who can control the zone and draw a walk.  And both players put up similar numbers, with Smith slashing a .249/.342/.415 in 2016, and Aoki a .283/.349/.388.

However, once getting past the slash line, Aoki begins to distance himself as the more valuable player.

For starters, Aoki is more athletic than Smith, and far more fleet of foot on the bases, both of which are qualities Dipoto favors.

Production-wise, Smith is used primarily against right handed pitching.  And in this role, Smith was solid, producing a .256/.351/.431.  But against right handed pitching, the switch hitting Aoki was better, slashing a .300/.364/.428.

Aoki is also much better at making contact. In 2016, Aoki put bat-to-ball at a 89.3% clip with a strike-out rate of just 9%.  Smith’s contact rate was 79% while striking out 20% of the time.

Turning to defense, neither Aoki or Smith are close to being gold glove caliber players. Yet, as uninspiring as Aoki was on defense, Smith was far worse.

Aoki produced a -8.0 UZR/150 and a -4 DRS in the OF last season, which is not good. But Smith was nearly twice as bad, posting a -16.6 UZR/150 and a -7 DRS.

And then there is that second half drop off in offensive production that taints Smith each and every season. This was a concern of ours way back when Smith was first acquired.  This concern has yet to go away.

In 2016, Smith produced a .277/.366/.450 in the first half. In the second half, those numbers plummeted to a .222/.312/.361.   In 2015, Smith’s first half numbers were .268/.338/.477.  In the second half those numbers dropped to .219/.319/.394.   What about 2014 you ask? .283/.387/.508 in the first half, .243/.340/.346 in the second.

For his career, Smith has averaged a .276/.359/.471 in the first half, and a .240/.323/.414 in the second half.

Aoki was the opposite of Smith in 2016, producing an underwhelming .245/.323/.313 in the first half.  But after a brief stint in Tacoma, Aoki returned to destroy AL pitching in the second half to the tune of a .339/.390/.500.

This drastic split in 2016 was, for the most part, an anomaly for Aoki as his career first/second half marks are faily even, with a .289/.352/.366 in the first half, and a .289/.353/.414 in the second.

Add all of this up, and Aoki was worth 1.2 fWAR in 2016 while Smith was worth 0.5 fWAR.

Given all of these factors, its hard to imagine the reason for keeping Smith over Aoki, especially since Aoki would have cost less.  Perhaps Dipoto did so in order to retain Smith as a trade piece in to fill other needs, much akin to the San Diego Padres picking up Joaquin Benoit’s option last off-season with the intent to trade him.

Smith did hit 16 homeruns last season so, in a league that still values the long ball, Dipoto may feel Smith would appeal more to other teams looking to upgrade their offense.

Dipoto has repeatedly stated that no single transaction should be viewed in isolation.  Let’s hope picking up Smith’s option is just the first step in a series of connected future moves to improve the team for 2017.