Category Archives: Mariners

Mariners Need to Emulate Red Sox, Invest Wisely in Free Agency

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One can only imagine that while the Boston Red Sox were celebrating their 2013 World Series championship, there alone sitting in a dark corner office was Jack Zduriencik, astonished from what he was seeing transpire on the TV.

Because that night, Zduriencik had to witness a Red Sox team – one that finished 69-93 just a year ago – be crowned the best team in all of baseball for 2013.

And as second year Boston GM Ben Cherington conveyed to the world that he simply was “just happy to be along for the ride,” one can be sure at that very moment, Zduriencik’s blood pressure began to rise ever so slightly, realizing that, entering his sixth year as GM of the Seattle Mariners, he had yet to put together a team that has allowed him to feel – even for just a moment – “happy to be along for the ride.”

2013 was supposed to be that type of season for Zduriencik and the Mariners.  No, not one that would be punctuated with a World Series Championship.  But one that would see the Mariners continue to grow and reach expectations of surpassing the .500 mark and even possibly contend for a playoff spot.  The type of season that would validate the prolonged rebuilding plan that Zduriencik and Howard Lincoln have vowed was the right path to winning.

But 2013 ended up being quite the opposite.  And the Red Sox World Series championship season only provided further testimony that perhaps Zduriencik needs to re-evaluate the Mariners’ rebuild approach, and maybe take some notes from the Red Sox’s second year GM.

Unlike Zduriencik and the Mariners, Cherington utilizes a develop and contend at the same time approach by placing an importance upon both cultivating homegrown talent, and investing in quality free agents who can facilitate winning in the immediate and in the years to come .

Cherington’s belief, of course, should be nothing new to the Mariners.  It was the same method used by former GM Pat Gillick who dipped heavily into free agency while refraining from trading away top prospects.  But despite the string of 90+ win seasons and playoff appearances accomplished during the Gillick years, these days what is heard from Mariners headquarters is that developing from within, while acquiring cheap disposable stopgap free agents, is the smarter approach.   The theory being that if a low cost veteran acquisition doesn’t pan out, the team can simply cut them mid-season and eat the remaining money owed without being hamstrung by multi-year contract obligations.   Of course, if and when that happens, what truly has occurred is wasted valuable payroll, and a team struggling as a result of poor veteran acquisitions.  And as Mariner fans can attest to the past five seasons, wasted payroll and poor veteran acquisitions has summed up the Mariners and their free agent acquisitions.

What the Mariners need to remember is that if a team goes about free agency with intelligence, the cost-benefit analysis will play to the investor’s favor despite the money spent up front.

The 2013 Boston Red Sox were a prime example of this, and one way this is revealed is via team WAR.

While Zduriencik and the Mariners were busy offering up a king’s ransom for Josh Hamilton, the Red Sox went out and focused their efforts on second-tier free agents. Among those that they signed were Shane Victorino, Jonny Gomes, Mike Napoli, and David Ross – two outfielders, a DH/1B, and a backup catcher.  The foursome would fill holes in the Red Sox lineup at a cost of 34.1 million for 2013.

Now, before we go any further, there is the argument that the Mariners were unable to spend 34.1 million on free agents, which would have raised payroll upwards to 100 million.  But let’s not forget that the Mariners were prepared to drop 20 million on Hamilton.  Such a signing would have put payroll around 95 million assuming that a Hamilton acquisition would have eliminated the need to trade for Michael Morse.  As the attempted Hamilton signing illustrates, the money is there to spend.  It’s just a matter of how the Mariners choose to spend it.

After the Mariner’s all-or-nothing pursuit of Hamilton came up empty, Zduriencik – like the Red Sox – acquired two outfielders, a DH/1B, and a backup catcher to fill holes for 2013. Morse, Raul Ibanez, Kendrys Morales, and Kelly Shoppach would end up costing half as much as the Red Sox’s four acquisitions; 16.25 million for the upcoming season.

According to Baseball-Reference, Morse, Ibanez, Morales and Shoppach wound up combining for a dismal 1.8 WAR for the Mariners in 2013. Shoppach ended up being designated for assignment mid-season, and Morse lived up to his can’t-stay-healthy reputation by spending much of the time on the disabled list before being traded to the Orioles.   Despite paying out less than half as much as Boston, Zduriencik spent a whopping 9 million per WAR produced from his veteran acquisitions.

Conversely, Victorino, Gomes, Napoli, and Ross would become central players for the Red Sox, combining for 12.1 WAR.  Despite spending over twice as much as the Mariners, Cherington not only received better production, but ended up paying a mere 2.8 million per WAR produced.

The Mariners’ investment costs may have been considerably less, but their returns were practically non-existent.  As the old saying goes, the Mariners got what they paid for.

The Mariners 2013 payroll landed somewhere in the neighborhood of 82 million and finished with a team WAR of 23.2, resulting in a 3.53 million spent per WAR produced.  If, say, the Mariners had acquired Victorino, Gomes, Napoli, and Ross instead of Morse, Ibanez, Morales and Shoppach, their payroll would have been 99 million, their team WAR would have increased to 33.5, and their per WAR expenditure would have dropped to 2.96 million.

Yes, the Mariners would have needed to spend more money, but in the end, a far better return on their investment would have been achieved.  And any successfully run business will place more importance on returns than on investment costs.

Now, a team WAR of 33.5 would not have been enough to expect a playoff berth.  Normally playoff-caliber teams produce a team WAR of 40 or more.  The average team WAR of the five American League playoff teams this year was 47.12, with Cleveland coming in at the lowest with a team WAR of 39.3.

But a team WAR or 30 or better should result in a .500 or better season.  If we look at the four teams that didn’t make the American League playoffs but who finished with an above .500 record – the Rangers, Orioles, Yankees and Royals – their average team WAR was 38.65 with the Yankees coming in with the lowest team WAR of 30.3 and finishing 85-77.

Accordingly, it can be fairly surmised that if the Mariners had produced a 33.5 team WAR, they would have finished 2013 with at least 81 wins.  With a solid core of returning veterans and expected growth from their blossoming group young players, the Mariners would seemingly be in good position to take the next step towards playoff contention.  But instead, the Mariners went the opposite direction, and ended up distancing themselves as a playoff caliber contender.

There’s no question that the Mariners have a lot of areas that need to be fixed, heading into 2014.  The Mariners currently have no manager, are riddled with holes throughout their starting lineup, rotation, and bullpen, and are being led by a GM whose future with the Mariners is, at best, questionable.

But one area that should be easily corrected entering 2014 is the methodology behind Zduriencik’s veteran acquisitions.  Cheap and safe have not delivered.  It’s time the Mariners take a page out of the Red Sox financial playbook, and begin making shrewd intellectual investments that will generate cost-effective results rather than acquisitions premised primarily on reduced risk, minimal contract obligations, and lowered payroll.

Mariners Go Back to the Well, Interview Chip Hale

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Since the resignation of Eric Wedge, Oakland Athletics bench coach Chip Hale has long been rumored to be on Zduriencik’s radar as a possible replacement.  Today, the rumors became true as Hale met with Mariners officials, kicking off the Mariners latest managerial search.

For those that need a refresher, Hale was a candidate to fill the Mariners’ vacant managerial seat in 2008.  Back then, Hale brought with him six years experience as a minor league manager, and two years experience as a third base coach, all of which fit nicely into Zduriencik’s “no major league managing experience” requirement.  However, when the interviewing process was completed, Zduriencik found his “crown jewel” manager in A’s bench coach Don Wakamatsu.

When the Wakamatsu experiment came to a crashing halt in 2010, Zduriencik put together his next list of managerial candidates.  Unlike before, this time prior managing experience was a must.  Zduriencik would interview Bobby Valentine, Lloyd McClendon, John Gibbons, and Cecil Cooper before finally settling upon Eric Wedge.

Now, five years after Zduriencik’s initial managerial hiring, he’s again looking for another manager.  And this time around, it’s back to “no experienced required” with Hale being mentioned as one of the leading contenders.  Others whose names have surfaced as potential candidates:  Matt Williams, Torey Lovullo, Ron Wotus, Sandy Alomar, Jr., Joey Cora, and Dave Martinez.

Now, I am not going to pretend to know whether or not someone like Chip Hale would make a good manager.  My own personal opinion is that first time managers are best suited on veteran teams –teams that know how to manage themselves – and experienced and war-tested managers are most effective for young unproven ball clubs thirsting for direction.  But truthfully, managerial success comes in all shapes, sizes, experience levels and ages.  Hale’s resume lacks experience, but certainly warrants consideration within the parameters of first time managerial candidates.  But whether an inexperienced manager will end up being the the right fit for an inexperienced Mariners club is simply anybody’s guess.

But here are two things we do know:

First, the last time Zduriencik and the Mariners hired an A’s bench coach with no prior big league managerial experience, and whose resume included time as a big league third base coach, a minor league manager, and a graduate of an Arizona college, the outcome ended up being far from ideal.  In fact, it ended up being a huge black eye for the organization.

Second, the past three managerial searches under Zduriencik have gone from not wanting experience, to requiring experience, to now back to not needing experience.   While the Mariners rebuilding plan has remained constant and will again feature another season of mostly young unproven players, the prerequisites for what it takes to manage the rebuild effort continues to be in flux.  Consistency in Zduriencik’s vision of a manager to lead the Mariners has been all but nonexistent.  And that is not good.

The upcoming 2014 season will mark the beginning of year six of the Jack Zduriencik era.  If the Mariners want to avoid dragging this rebuild effort out for another six to ten years, they have to get this managerial hiring right.   Whether it’s Chip Hale, or Torey Lovullo, or someone else like Lloyd McClendon, there is no more room for error.  Whichever road Zduriencik chooses to take, wasting three to four more years on another failed manager is no longer an option.

Time for the Seattle Mariners to Hire Dusty Baker

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It’s been 3 weeks since Eric Wedge abruptly resigned as the manager of the Seattle Mariners. And while Mariners officials have stayed the usual course of remaining silent when it comes to what might be stirring within their think tank, they have been vocal in their efforts to explain – from their perspective – what really transpired during that final week of the season that caused Wedge to reverse his public statements of wanting to stay with the Mariners, made just one week prior to his resignation.

And when I say “explain” I mean paint Wedge as someone who couldn’t get his top prospects to produce at the big league level, had lost the confidence of almost everyone who had a hand in running this team, and, therefore, as someone who had the audacity to ask for a multi-year contract extension after a season in which the Mariners regressed rather than take further steps forward.

Of course, it’s impossible to know what truly happened.  The Mariners are saying one thing, Wedge is saying another thing, and Jack Zduriencik remains silent, choosing to sit on his hands and not comment on any of the claims being made by the people that work for him.

But what is clear is that the Mariners are in damage control.  Entering an offseason needing one or two bats in the outfield, a DH, a #3 starter, at least one arm for the bullpen, and now a manager, the Mariners are trying to quickly sweep away the bitter residue left behind from yet another managerial hiring gone bad.

And although the Mariner brooms are at terminal velocity, the rest of the baseball world is left gawking at an organization moving at a pace only Rip Van Winkle could appreciate.

An organization that has become the MLB version of Groundhogs Day, with Zduriencik playing the part of Phil Connors, desperately trying to piece together the right combination of changes to cease the nightmare of reliving the same failures over and over again.

Now, don’t get me wrong.  This isn’t to say that Eric Wedge leaving the Mariners is some tragic loss.  Believe me, it’s not.

For the record, I was never a fan of Eric Wedge. Back in October of 2010, I was highly critical of his hiring despite the Mariners PR machine working overtime to tout Wedge as some great prospect developer.  A persona the Mariners derived from his Cleveland Indians managerial days, during which time a handful of players made the transition from minor league prospects to major league all-stars.  But as most understand, the prospect game is tricky business.  Some organizations will hit the jack pot with their highly-ranked prospects like Cleveland did during the early 2000’s.  But others, like the Mariners and their top prospects, will not.  And realistically speaking, seldom does such a group of talented young prospects all successfully emerge at the same time like they did with Cleveland.  That anomaly  should have raised question within the Mariner brain trust as to whether Wedge really did contain some magical touch that transformed prospects into all-stars, or if he was just the beneficiary of being in the right place at the right time?  And if it was the latter, which it most likely was, then there really was no upside to his hiring other than the fact he was cheap and willing to buy into Howard Lincoln’s and Jack Zduriencik’s blueprint for rebuilding.

No, Wedge’s departure is not a setback. Rather, it’s an opportunity.  And a golden opportunity, at that.  Because at a time when the Mariners desperately need to find someone who can help save a sinking ship, standing in the managerial unemployment line is someone whose resume is filled with a track record of transforming stagnant, underachieving teams into playoff contending teams.

Jack Zduriencik and Howard Lincoln:  Meet Dusty Baker.

That’s right, Dusty Baker.  The manager who supposedly cannot handle young pitchers, and who is allegedly responsible for burning out the arms of Kerry Wood and Mark Prior;  who plays favorites; prefers veterans to rookies; and supposedly rejects advanced metrics by his suggestion that clogging up the base paths with the sluggish and the slow-footed can sometimes be more of a detriment than beneficial.

You know, the manager accused of being the second gunman on the grassy knoll.

Look, I won’t argue that Baker doesn’t have his detractors.  What manager doesn’t?  I mean, there is no such thing as the “perfect” manager.  But his critics, by and large, are from the arm chair GM variety.  And regardless of the myriad of criticisms that get thrown his way by those that do not play the game, one undeniable truth remains constant: those that do play the game love playing for Baker.  They buy into his philosophies, and play hard for him.  Heck, Baker was fired for sticking up for his hitting coach.  He took a bullet for someone who helped him be successful.  What player wouldn’t want to go to war with that type of manager?

If his managerial track record is any indication, not many.  Baker has gone to the playoffs with every team he has managed – three times with the Giants, including the World Series; once with the Cubs; and three times with the Reds.  In his 20 seasons as a manager, Baker has achieved twelve .500+ seasons, including seven seasons of 90 or more wins.  Baker’s managerial success has resulted in him being voted NL Manager of the Year three times.

Simply put, Baker wins wherever he goes.  He turns teams into winners.  He is the Pat Gillick of managers.

And for a team like the Mariners, that’s huge.  Because entering an offseason where the Mariners are in need of a whole lot of help, Baker does what no other first year manager can do: he brings instant credibility to an organization that currently has none.

You want Jacoby Ellsbury? Perhaps Shin-Soo Choo?  Well, let me be the first to tell you that the hiring of the Chip Hales’ or Joey Cora’s of the bench coaching world aren’t going to do anything for the Mariners in that endeavor.

But bring Baker aboard, sit him across from Ellsbury or Choo, have Baker look either player square in the eyes, and tell them that things are about to change in Mariner Nation or else he (Baker) wouldn’t be here if they weren’t?  Well, I can pretty much guarantee you an Ellsbury or Choo is going to listen.  And although either player still might not sign with the Mariners, you can be sure that they and agent Scott Boras will walk away from the negotiating table convinced the Mariners are, indeed, serious.

And that, alone, would be a huge step forward for an organization that was turned down by Josh Hamilton, stating afterwards that the Mariners were never serious players in their attempt at signing the free agent slugger.  And who were also rejected by Justin Upton in the trade that would have brought the gifted outfielder to Seattle for 2013 and beyond.

Of course, all of this begs the question of whether or not Zduriencik and Lincoln have the gumption to hire Dusty Baker?  Realistically, Zduriencik and Lincoln won’t even interview him.  Because hiring someone like Baker would require Lincoln and Zduriencik to give up – or at least share in – a bit of the decision making process when it comes to player personnel and roster construction.  That is something quality veteran managers of Baker’s stature normally require.  And that is something this organization has been reluctant to give up ever since Lou Piniella left town.  But, hey, one can hope, right?

Because, you know, despite continually making the same mistakes over and over again, even Phil Connors eventually figured out how to stop the endless cycle of madness.

Let’s just hope Lincoln and Zduriencik can do the same.

Revisiting Zduriencik’s Infamous 2010 Letter

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As the Mariners begin their search for their third manager in five seasons, we at Mission Mariner are reminded of the letter Jack Zduriencik e-mailed to season ticket holders the last time the Mariners found themselves in this very position.

The letter written after the fateful 2010 season, which saw the Mariners lose 101 games, and was highlighted by the firing of manager Don Wakamatsu midway through the season.

The letter where Zduriencik stood tall and defied all those know-it-all arm chair general managers by confidently assuring everyone that there were “plenty of reasons to believe that our long-term plan is working.”

It’s now been three years since that bold assertion made by Zduriencik. An assertion that teetered   on arrogance considering the calamity that transpired both on and off the field that season. Nonetheless, it served as a direct response to the cynics who now had 2010 to use as confirmation for their dissension, while providing reason, for those thinking of jumping ship, to stay on board a little while longer.

First, the farm system.

“We’ve got a flock of top-rated prospects on their way to the big club. These include position players Dustin Ackley, Justin Smoak, Carlos Peguero, Nick Franklin, Kyle Seager, Johermyn Chavez, Greg Halman and Matt Mangini, along with hard-throwing pitchers like Michael Pineda, Blake Beavan, Dan Cortes, Mauricio Robles, Maikel Cleto and Anthony Varvaro. Many of our best prospects are headed for winter ball and the fall instructional league – they’re driven to improve and play at the next level.

Some of these youngsters will develop faster than others, but we’ve got a rich pipeline of talent. Impressive, considering how thin our minor league system was just a couple of years ago. Plus there are more top prospects coming: We have the #2 pick in the 2011 June draft and we continue to scout and sign top international players.”

Now, fourteen “top prospects” and a top draft pick – eventual selection Danny Hultzen – coming down a “rich pipeline” all of whom are “driven to improve and play at the next level” is pretty impressive.  Most every franchise would be lucky to have such talent in their farm system.

Except, today, eight of those top prospects are no longer with the team (Chavez, Halman, Mangini, Pineda, Cortes, Robles, Cleto and Varvaro), one is still in the minors (Peguero), one is dealing with a serious rotator injury (Hultzen), and four are still trying to prove they should stick on a big league roster (Smoak, Ackley, Franklin and Beavan).

Of that group of fourteen, only one has solidified himself as a productive everyday major league player (Seager).

So, the minor league talent hasn’t panned out as Zduriencik projected back in 2010.  No problem. There’s talent on the big league club, right?

“At the big league level, Mariners pitchers tied for the third best ERA in the American League in 2010. Felix Hernandez has fulfilled his potential as a perennial Cy Young candidate. Jason Vargas, Doug Fister and Luke French made major strides in 2010. We like our pitching; our staff is young, developing and hungry.

Two young players, catcher Adam Moore and outfielder Michael Saunders, got valuable playing time and impressed scouts around the league. Meanwhile, our four core players – Ichiro, Felix, Guti and Chone Figgins  – are signed to long-term deals.”

This time, Zduriencik names nine major league players, four of whom he specifically labels as “core” players, as well as group of pitchers singled out as essentially young, developing, top flight rotation arms.

And what franchise wouldn’t want that?   Not knowing any better, one would surmise the Mariners were sporting a solid core group of players to build around, two young impressive up-the-middle defenders, and one of the best young rotations in baseball.

Unfortunately, of those nine players named, six are no longer with the team (Vargas, Fister, French, Moore, Ichiro, Figgins), one spends more time on the DL than on the field (Guti), and one is still struggling to show he belongs on a big league roster (Saunders).

Of the four deemed “core” players, only Felix has lived up to the billing.  Regarding those Mariners pitchers who tied for the third best ERA in the American League?  Just Felix remains.

So, what does all this mean?

It means you can crumble up that letter from 2010 and throw it into the recycle bin.  Because all that’s really remaining from all of those “top prospects” and “core” major league players that Zduriencik boasted about is Seager, Felix and, um, well…that’s about it.

Seager and Felix.

It also means that for as much hope and excitement the Mariners want you to feel with the newest wave of top prospects to have reached the big leagues – Mike Zunino, Brad Miller, Taijuan Walker, James Paxton, and Nick Franklin – the 2010 season and the Zduriencik letter is a yet another stark reminder that prospect rankings are meaningless as it relates to future MLB success.

Because when the 2013 season kicked off, the Mariners started four of the top 30 prospects from 2010 – Montero (4), Ackley (11), Smoak (13) and Saunders (30).

All of whom were collectively ranked higher than the next subsequent catcher/infielder/first baseman/outfielder quartet ranked on that list – Buster Posey (7), Alceides Escobar (12), Logan Morrison (20) and Todd Frazier (43).  A group of players that every GM in baseball today would probably take over the foursome the Mariners had accumulated.

And if we are keeping it real, most every GM in baseball would probably just take Posey over Montero, Ackley, Smoak and Saunders

Which isn’t to say that those four can’t eventually live up to expectations.  Or that Zunino, Miller, Walker, Paxton, or Franklin won’t end up being productive major league players.  Rather, audacious boasting of unproven players will prove foolhardy more often than not, no matter what number precedes a player’s name on some prospect rankings list.

Which is probably why Howard Lincoln talked strictly about baseball operations instead of player evaluations when recently asked his personal thoughts on the current state of the team.  And considering how Lincoln, Zduriencik and the rest of the Mariners’ upper management team has seemingly adopted a dormant approach when it comes to expounding on organizational decision making, it’s not really surprising that Lincoln quickly side-stepped the opportunity to offer his opinion regarding the young players on the big league roster.

Or maybe Lincoln, Zduriencik and the rest of the Mariners’ upper management team learned their lesson from 2010, and are not prepared to make the same mistake twice.

Because Zduriencik’s 2010 letter – that infamous letter meant to show season ticket holders that the Mariners were, in fact, doing things right despite losing 101 games – now stands as a glaring beacon of irony, warning the baseball world of the dangers that come from prognosticating the future of prospects, especially by a franchise who’s successful return to playing competitive and meaningful baseball hinges on an uncompromising prospect-only rebuild methodology.

Lou Piniella Rejects the Mariners

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The mystic chords of memory.

In 1861, Abraham Lincoln gave his first inaugural address to a fractured nation, proclaiming that, despite the uncertainties of the time, the county’s shared grandeur of the past would soon be resurrected, thereby uniting a diminished populace.

This past week, another Lincoln (Howard, that is), Jack Zduriencik and the Seattle Mariners reminded Mariners fans that we, too – despite uncertain times – are forever united by a common history.

A common history of success that Lincoln and Zduriencik also hoped could be resurrected, thereby uniting a fractured and diminished fan base.

Recent reports from the hot stove indicate that Jack Zduriencik contacted Lou Piniella to see if he would be interested in managing the rudderless Mariners.  Some reports suggest the Mariners put on a “full court press” in an attempt to coax the 70-year old out of retirement, although Mariners officials are now refuting such accounts.  However aggressive the Mariners’ efforts were, it wasn’t enough as Piniella turned down the chance to once again don Mariner blue and teal.

Now, watching Sweet Lou once again out on Safeco Field lighting a fire under his players, shot putting bases into the outfield, and getting up close and personal with umpires when they’ve made a bad call would be a welcomed sight after being exposed to the managerial malaise of Eric Wedge the past three seasons.

But given the track record of this franchise since 2003 – a track record of focusing managerial pursuits on assistant coaches looking for first opportunities, or ex-managers seeking second chances – the anti Piniella types, if you will – the news of a Piniella re-hiring was indeed surprising.

Perhaps even baffling, in a “hey, let’s go out and acquire four DH’s” type of way.

And, of course, in this day and age of advanced statistics, there is the question of whether an old-school manager like Piniella, who isn’t the best at handling pitching staffs, and who puts more of a premium on player production than he does on player hand holding, is actually the right fit for team that, well, – let’s be honest – has needed a lot of hand holding the past few years.

And while most of my Mariner brethren are scratching their heads over an attempted Mariners-Piniella reunion, I’m wondering if there might be a little bit of intellect behind the move?

Perhaps a reboot  in tactic last seen since, yes, the hiring of Lou Piniella.

This past season, many had high expectations for a Mariner club coming off a 75-87 record, their third straight improved season.

With the additions of power hitters Kendrys Morales and Mike Morse to stabilize the middle of the order, expected improvements from their young core players, a solid bullpen, and the return of starting pitcher Felix Hernandez, many expected at least a .500 season with a playoff berth a possibility.

As things turned out, Morse struggled with injury all season, and never was able to display the power he produced in years prior.  The young core was unable to take any significant steps forward.  The bullpen was shaky at best.  And Felix wasn’t the dominating ace everyone has come to expect.

The result was a season where the Mariners finished 71-91 – the sixth worst record in all of baseball – while finishing 25 games back from division winner Oakland.

In the eyes of most, the M’s not only failed to reach expectations, but more concerning, took a big step backwards when most predicted continued steps forward.

Which now, unexpectedly, has the Mariners reaching out to Piniella to try and turn things around.

Sound vaguely familiar?

It should.

In 1991, Jim Lefebvre and the Seattle Mariners finally accomplished what its long suffering, infinitesimal fan base had been waiting for – a .500 season.

Led by a fairly young (yet fairly accomplished) core headed by 21 year-old Ken Griffey Jr., the Mariners finished 83-79 marking the first winning season in franchise history.

Riding a wave of optimism into the offseason, the front office traded for slugger Kevin Mitchell to bolster the middle of its offense.  Mitchell averaged 36 homeruns during the three previous seasons, and with his bat hitting cleanup behind Martinez and Griffey, and in front of Buhner, the Mariners envisioned a potent middle-of-the-order lineup that could make playoff contention possible.

But, as such the story so often goes, that vision never came to fruition.

Mitchell suffered through an injury plagued season, playing in only 99 games due to an early season wrist injury, and then a broken foot suffered the first week of September, placing him on the disabled list for the remainder of the year.  The vaunted power Mitchell had previously displayed evaporated that season, having managed only 9 homeruns and a .428 slugging percentage.

Adding insult to (Mitchell’s) injury, the departures of Bill Swift and Mike Jackson – the central pieces used to acquire Mitchell – left a Mariner bullpen short on quality arms.  The result was a relief corps that posted a 4.84 runs allowed in save situations, and 4.72 runs allowed overall.

In a season that began with high expectations and talks of the playoffs, the Mariners floundered.

Badly.

They ended the year with a 64-98 record – the second worst record in all of baseball – finishing 32 games behind first place Oakland

Much like 2013, the 1992 season exposed the Mariners for what they were – a fairly young and talented up and coming team, lacking confidence, and still trying to figure out how to win at the MLB level.

So the Mariners went out and did something that shocked most everyone in the MLB world:  they invested a significant amount of money on a manager who expected nothing less than winning.

Enter Lou Piniella and his three World Series rings – two as a player and one as manager of the Reds just three years prior.

No more Jim Snyders.  No more Jim Lefebvres.  No more Bill Plummers.

Most of all, no more coddling the kids.

This time, the hiring was about bringing in a leader who would set the tone and direction, not only for the players but the franchise as well.

Simply put, it was about attitude. It was about winning.  And as we all know, that’s all Piniella did with the M’s, posting  7 winning seasons over the next 10 years, including four 90+ win seasons, four playoff appearances and the historic 116 win season of 2001.

Now, 10 years removed from the Piniella era, the Mariners are again coming off a season where they failed to reach heightened expectations, and are again searching for a manager to help turn things around.

And like all those years since Piniella last managed the Mariners, the names that have surfaced in the media have been more of the usual suspects – assistant coaches looking for their first shot to manage in the big leagues.

Guys like Bryan Price, Joey Cora, Chip Hale, and internal candidates Daren Brown, Robby Thompson and even Ted Simmons.

But maybe the attempted Piniella hiring is a sign that this time around, the Mariners are looking for something more than just a low cost manager who won’t rock the boat.

An indication the Mariners are looking for a manager to first and foremost lead players, not pamper and tutor players.

Someone overflowing with so much moxy, the surrounding players will become saturated in excellence, confidence, and that “refuse to lose” arrogance that defined the Piniella years.

Maybe, just maybe,  this time around Zduriencik has come to realize that with youth and rawness on the field, it’s best to have success and experience in the dugout.

And that our own mystic chords of memory can cast a light upon the pathway back towards success.

Hisashi Iwakuma and the Cy Young Award

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After a season like the one the Mariners just completed, I often feel like a part of me has been ripped from my core, tarred and feathered, and then thrown over a telephone wire for all to see.  Because at the beginning of every season, despite knowing better, I will lock away rational thought and say to anyone who will listen, “this is the year the Mariners could make some noise!”  And because I never learn my lesson, today after a 91 loss campaign, all I’m left with is the annual walk-of-shame where I offer up a “my bad” to all those who dared to not see the Mariners playing in October.

But in the midst of this shame, there comes a sliver of light in the form of post-season awards.  Because no matter how awful one’s team played, there is always the chance that someone will rise above the fog of ineptitude and actually perform their god-given talent better than anyone else.  And while it doesn’t change the past or necessarily offer hope for the future, it does something much more important.  It recoups a bit of lost dignity. It resurrects buried pride, even if for just a moment.

And that’s big.  It’s huge.

Because the next time you’re at a party, and your friends are giving you grief over Henry Blanco, or Aaron Harang, or any of the numerous choices the Mariners have to offer as examples of how to achieve 91 losses, you can hold your head high, stick out your chest, and utter the words Hisashi Iwakuma.  Because by doing so, I can almost guarantee you the room will suddenly go silent, your friends will take a step back, and that beautiful blonde you’ve been eyeing from across the room will finally take notice.

In a season full of disappointment, Kuma was anything but.  He not only established himself as a bona fide ace for a team that already had one in the form of King Felix, but he also proved to be one of the best pitchers in league.  Arguably, he was the lone bright spot for the Mariners this season.  Sure, Felix also had a good season.  But Felix wasn’t quite Felix.  And Kuma, this year, was simply better.

Which brings us to the Cy Young Award.  Now, I’m under no delusions that Kuma will actually win it.  Nor do I believe he should win it.  He certainly deserves to be mentioned, but there really is no sensible argument that would support Kuma winning the award.

But over at USS Mariner, Jeff Sullivan takes a stab at trying to convince otherwise.  Before I go any further, let me just say I enjoy Sullivan’s writing and analysis on the Mariners.  Lookout Landing has always been in my radius of interesting reads.  USSM? Well, that’s a discussion for another day.  But certainly LL.

In a nutshell, Sullivan relies on RA/9 to make his case for Kuma and the Cy Young.  And specifically, he focuses much of the attention on wOBA.   Now, I love wOBA.  It’s the stat I normally turn to first when evaluating players, especially from an offensive standpoint.  And it certainly is an important stat when evaluating pitching.  So I understand why Sullivan chose to go with it.

Sullivan assures us that there is an argument to be made for Kuma winning the Cy Young based on RA/9 and wOBA.  And I don’t necessarily doubt that.  The problem, though, is that an argument can be made for just about anything.  Just ask my 10-year-old daughter.  She does a fantastic job of making arguments…in regard to just about everything.  This is not to say Sullivan is on equal footing as my daughter, but, more to the point, just because an argument can be made, doesn’t really mean there is an actual argument to be made.

Sullivan’s position is that preventing runners from scoring is a pitcher’s most important job.  And a pitcher does that by preventing batters from getting on base, especially when runners are already occupying the base paths.

And clearly Kuma excelled in this category in 2013.  As Sullivan points out, Kuma’s RA/9 was a league best 2.83, buoyed by a wOBA with runners on base of .248.  And if RA/9 and wOBA were the sole criteria to be used in judging the Cy Young Award, then Kuma should win it.  By a landslide.

And this is where Sullivan goes a bit astray – by relying solely on RA/9 and, more narrowly, wOBA with runners on base, to make his case.

Now, if you are familiar with the guys over at USSM, they like to pride themselves of being objective via their focus on advanced metrics.  Try and infuse debate that isn’t premised in advanced metrics?  It’s a sure way to get mocked and laughed at.

Or banned.

Don’t believe me?  Just go over there and argue for something like, say, lineup protection. Or clutch hitting.  Or the importance of wins by a pitcher.

You’ll become enemy #1 faster than Pat Gillick can put together a playoff caliber MLB roster.

Which is why I’m surprised at how Sullivan chose to approach his position.  Because unless my liberal studies degree has failed me, I’m pretty sure looking at just one – or even two – statistical measures is anything but objective analysis.  Especially when it comes to an award given to the best overall pitcher in each league.  And I say best overall pitcher because the award should be based on multiple factors, not just one, regardless of how important you believe that one factor is.

If we look at Kuma’s wOBA with the bases empty, he falls to 10th in the league at .287.  Not that 10th in the league is horrible, but it’s also not stellar.  Clearly Kuma’s elevated wOBA with the bases empty is attributed to his serving up 19 home runs – 7th most in the league (also, not stellar).  But Kuma also gave up 124 hits in 139.2 innings pitched.  If we look at, say, Max Scherzer – who ranked 1st in wOBA with the bases empty, he gave up 19 fewer hits while pitching only one less inning.

Broaden the voting criteria a little bit and Kuma ranks 5th in OPS against (not bad), 9th in Quality Starts Percentage (uh oh), 11th in SLG against (yikes), and 12th in WAR (ouch).

Still think Kuma should win the Cy?

Scherzer led the league in WHIP, OBP against, OPS against, and WAR, while finishing 2nd in Quality Starts Percentage, BA against, and SLG against.

Which isn’t to say Scherzer should win the Cy.  But, rather, the more you add to the equation, the less Kuma looks like a Cy Young Award winner, even with his league leading RA/9.

So, with the whole wOBA discussion, perhaps it’s just best to say that Kuma excelled at cleaning up his own mess.  Which is still fantastic.  Just maybe not ideal.  And probably not enough to try to convince anyone that Kuma should win the Cy Young.

Because, personally, one walk-of-shame this season is enough.

The End of the Eric Wedge Era

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Today, we launch the beginning of Mission Mariner as the Eric Wedge era, as manager of the Seattle Mariners, comes to an end.

Just three days ago, the Mariners issued a press release stating what many had anticipated after a disappointing 2013 season:  that Wedge would not be returning to manage the team in 2014.  Three seasons of questionable in-game decision making, an inability to develop top MLB ready prospects, and this season’s eventual 91 loss season, made it far from shocking that Wedge tendered his resignation.

And while the news of Wedge stepping down is arguably a good thing for this team, we should all take worry in the reasons put forth.

Wedge is not stepping down because he was about to be fired.  Jack Zduriencik (finally) offered up a one year extension for 2014.  Yet, rather than take the job and money, Wedge chose to walk away due to what he perceived to be a difference in opinion between he and Zduriencik, Howard Lincoln and Chuck Armstrong as to the direction this ball club should be headed.

That’s right, a difference in opinion as to the direction this ball club should be headed.

This is the same Eric Wedge who has consistently toed the company line, professing over and over again how this organization is doing it the right way by building up the farm system, developing talent from the bottom up, letting young players cut their teeth at the MLB level even if it means taking a few lumps in the win/loss column, and building a strong core of young players the team will then supplement with proven veteran talent via free agency.

This has been the plan since 2009.  The plan Zduriencik was hired to implement throughout the minor leagues, the plan Eric Wedge was hired to carry out at the big league level, and the plan that has been sold to the fan base.

But now Wedge is leaving.  Leaving because he, Zduriencik and Armstrong apparently no longer see eye to eye with how this team should progress.   To what degree these differences are, we don’t know.  But enough to be irreconcilable, as Wedge would rather join the ranks of the unemployed than remain the on-field general of the Mariners.

In the midst of a 91 loss season, in year five of the rebuild process, Wedge addressed the media to rebut assertions by Zduriencik that he was leaving over his contract, and in doing so, offered everyone a glimpse into the actual modus operandi of this franchise.

“Let me be clear here: the contract is not the reason I’m not coming back here,” Wedge said. “If they’d offered me a five-year contract, I wouldn’t have come back here. So, let’s be clear with that.”

“It’s where they see the club,” he said. “They being Howard (Lincoln), Chuck (Armstrong) and Jack (Zduriencik). And where I see the club and my vision for the future and theirs, it’s just different. And that’s about as plain as I can make it.”

Wedge would go on to elicit his displeasure with the Mariners’ disfavor of supplementing the young Mariner core with quality veteran players who would create consistency, and help the team in the present and future.  Experienced players who were not just a year or two away from retirement, but in their prime years and signed to multi-year deals.

So what can we gather from all of this?

Without further information, it’s impossible to know for sure, as the Mariners are not talking, and Wedge won’t go into further detail.  But with the information we do have, it pretty much leads to one of two things.  Either A) Wedge no longer believes in the original Mariners’ rebuilding plan, or B) the Mariners have decided to alter the initial rebuilding plan as originally discussed with Wedge when he was hired.

Seeing how Wedge has consistently defended the plan to develop a core and supplement with proven talent, it doesn’t appear he has changed his belief in the original rebuilding plan.

Which leads us to option B.  And if that is the case, there seems to be only two paths the Mariners could go down.

The first would be to forego spending big (or bigger) money on multi-year deals for the kind of experienced players Wedge has seemingly coveted and been anticipating, and, instead, fill holes by promoting strictly from within the organization.

With money coming off the books, as well as added revenue attained via TV/cable deals, affording the cost of productive free agents who can help immediately shouldn’t be a problem.   However, if there is one thing this season has shown us, it’s that a team’s win/loss record and attendance figures are not nearly as important as they used to be in terms of yearly team profitability.  Because, as the Houston Astros demonstrated to the entire MLB world, producing the worst record in all of baseball and the fourth lowest attendance record, can still generate record profits if you have a Regional Sports Network deal tucked away in the organizational back pocket.

Which the Mariners now have.

And that would not be good for a Mariners franchise coming off a 91 loss season.  Sure, there is potential there.  But ultimately, this team needs help.  Serious help.  It has a lineup riddled with glaring offensive and defensive holes.   And if, indeed, the rebuild directive has changed and thus no longer includes the acquisition of productive veteran players to supplement the young core of players, that would mean potential offseason targets like Shin Soo Choo, or Jacoby Ellsbury, or Kendrys Morales – players in their prime who can help this team now and in the future – are no longer viable offseason options.

The other path to take would be to select a handful of young core players with MLB experience – like Brad Miller, Nick Franklin, Taijuan Walker, or James Paxton – and use them as trading chips for more established veteran players in hopes of speeding up the rebuild effort.

But combining a spotty trade record (see Fister for Wells, Morse for Langerhans, Jaso for Morse) with a win now objective, the result could prove disasterous, digging this organization into a hole deeper than we experienced under the Bavasi regime.

If either of these paths do become viable options, this organization may be looking at another 3 years before it contends for a .500 season, or possibly even longer if upper management trades away promising prospects for aging veterans.

And that should be concerning to all of us.

The weeks and months to come should tell us where this organization is headed.  But as of now, Summer is over.  Winter is coming.  And Eric Wedge’s resignation may very well have indicated an upcoming offseason ripe with discontent.